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FINANCE THEORY AND ACCOUNTING FRAUD: 
FANTASTIC FUTURES VERUS CONSERVATIVE HISTORIES 
 




 Intellectual tension between the fields of finance and accounting may help to 
explain explosion of public company frauds. Finance theory diminishes the relevance of 
accounting information. Enron exploited this consequence while the SEC bought into it.  
After widespread frauds were exposed, Congress passed laws that address symptoms of 
finance’s futurism, not disease.  Laws essentially prohibit pro forma financial reporting 
and regulate the selective flow of futuristic information to financial analysts. Untouched 
is the underlying disease of regulatory mandates requiring extensive disclosure of 
forward-looking information.  
 
 Until the 1970s, the SEC prudently prohibited such futuristic disclosure as 
inherently unreliable; assisted by finance theory, the SEC’s stance steadily eroded to 
require such disclosure.  The SEC likely had it right the first time.  It is too late to reverse 
the mandatory futuristic disclosure regime.  So reform policies must work within it. After 
elaborating the foregoing critique, this Essay mentions two: (1) future oriented 
disclosure should focus on material risks of future adversity and (2) accounting figures 
should be reported in ranges, not single amounts. 
Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud, Buffalo Law Review (2005) 
 
 
FINANCE THEORY AND ACCOUNTING FRAUD: 
FANTASTIC FUTURES VERUS CONSERVATIVE HISTORIES 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
  
 A secret at many leading business schools in the United States is a certain 
intellectual tension between the academic accounting and finance departments.  The 
secret should be shared, however, because the underlying reasons for this tension may 
help to explain the explosion of public company frauds in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This possibility is important because policymakers responded to those frauds without 
awareness of the tensions.  But the value of their reforms is diminished by ignoring how 
tools developed in the finance department retard those developed in the accounting 
department. 
 
 Finance theory’s rise to intellectual and policy influence began in the 1970s.  It 
threatened accounting’s relevance.  In essence, it denied that accounting forms matter, 
holding that markets pierce those forms to determine value independent of accounting 
presentation. Numerous side effects manifest this theory’s dominance. Prominent among 
these are two practical accounting developments—a movement toward fair-value 
measures and discounted cash flow analysis—and two widespread market practices—pro 
forma financial reporting and analyst earnings forecasts.  These and other side effects 
reside under the broad chapeau of the forward-looking disclosure regime inaugurated in 
the 1970s and expanded ever since.   
 
 Reforms responding to financial fraud addressed the two pervasive market 
practices—targeting symptoms of pro forma reporting and analyst forecasting—but 
failed to address the disease. Reforms quite possibly made financial reporting worse.  To 
correct this oversight, this essay recommends two steps: the forward-looking disclosure 
regime should include delineation of probable variability in financial data and financial 




 The most powerful theory affecting modern accounting arose outside the 
discipline, in the competing department of finance.  Dubbed modern finance theory, its 
key concept is the efficient market hypothesis.  Under it, all historical information, 
including accounting data, is rapidly impounded into stock price.  Moreover, under this 
hypothesis, all publicly-available information is accurately interpreted no matter how or 
                                                 
* Professor of Law & Business, Libby Scholar and Academic Dean, Boston College Law School.  
Copyright 2005.  All rights reserved.  Thanks to Bert Westbrook for inviting me to contribute this piece to 
the innovative Buffalo Law Review essay format he helped to pioneer. 
 
 2
Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud, Buffalo Law Review (2005) 
 
where it is presented.  These hypotheses—widely believed1—imply that any effort to 
improve accounting theory or practice is meaningless.  Finance theory’s contribution to 
accounting is thus its retardation, for three specific reasons.2 
 
 First, efficiency theory says the form of presenting accounting information does 
not matter.  If so, there is no point searching for an optimal form.  If identical data can be 
put in the balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, footnotes, or MD&A and 
generate the same interpretation and result on price, promoting accounting quality is 
wasteful.  The disincentives to develop superior accounting are obvious.3 
 
 Second, efficiency theory says accounting information is instantly useless.  
Struggles central to accounting as to allocating economic events to discrete time periods 
become moot.  Irrelevant are traditionally critical—and basic—matters such as rates of 
depreciation for long-lived assets and whether to measure inventory using the first-in-
first-out approach or the last-in-first-out method.  It even moots questions about whether 
and how to account for stock options, whose value and cost fluctuate over multiple 
periods and often are considerable.4   
 
 Third, efficiency theory says market price responds to cash flow effects of 
managerial decisions and policy, not to the effect on reported earnings per share.  
Companies should therefore never seek to manage earnings; investors see through it.  If 
so, accounting need not develop tools to discourage or detect such massage.5  It won’t 
happen.6  This implies, in turn, a relatively modest utility for elaborate systems of internal 
                                                 
1 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1984) (still the leading statement by leading corporate law scholars on market efficiency despite many 
critiques). 
 
2  Cf. Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 925 (1994). 
 
3  Cf. Thomas A. Downes & Thomas R. Dyckman, A Critical Look at the Efficient Market Empirical 
Research Literature as it Relates to Accounting Information, 48 ACCT. REV. 300 (1973). 
 
4 A leading columnist for the Wall Street Journal argues that it doesn't matter whether one accounts for 
stock options or not, for the market will figure out their significance without regard to accounting. Holman 
W. Jenkins Jr., Much Ado About Stock Options, WALL ST. J.,  Apr. 3, 2002, at A23: 
 
In the real world [sic], any information, as long as it's deemed relevant, will be processed 
into the mill for pricing securities. It doesn't matter whether the data is computed into the 
income statement or appears in a footnote or is shouted up and down Wall Street by a 
man in a tutu.  
 
Tell that to Enron shareholders. 
 
5  See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 813, 819 (2003) 
(“Under efficient market analysis, no regulation of accounting is needed”). 
 
6 E.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note ___, at 372 (“there are no financial illusions”). 
 
 3
Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud, Buffalo Law Review (2005) 
 
control over financial reporting (which are the heart of reforms adopted in the wake of 
financial frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
 
 In short, efficiency theory invokes presentiation.7  Presentiate is “[t]o make or 
render present in place or time; to cause to be perceived or realized as present.”8 In 
efficiency theory, all numerical history is absorbed into current stock price and becomes 
instantly irrelevant; all that matters is the future and even this gets “discounted” into 
price.  This model of presentiation is theology.  Yet its enormous power retarded 
accounting as numerical history and reoriented financial reporting to a forward-looking, 
less reliable, fraud-tempting emphasis on prognosis.    
 
 Consider two leading examples of finance theory’s force in driving accounting 
developments: the fair-value movement and cash-flow elevation. Accounting 
traditionally measures most assets using historical cost. The key reason for recording 
assets at historical cost is this is usually observable and provides objectivity. It is reliable.  
Advocates of more ambitious goals for accounting seek a fair-value approach.9  This fair-
value movement favors reporting all assets on the balance sheet at fair value.  The key 
motivation for fair value accounting is its currency; it is more relevant.   
 
 Accounting struggles with the trade off between reliability and relevance.  The 
result is an accounting system split between these aspirations, usually resolved under 
accounting’s conservatism principle in favor of reliability over relevance. The rising 
influence of finance caused a shift in accounting strongly to favor relevance over 
reliability.  True, fair value can be reported using appraisals or comparable transactions, 
                                                 
7  The chief contribution of this concept to legal literature was made in respect of criticism of the classical 
theory of contracts which appeared to hold a conceit that contract formation achieved the reduction of 
future events to present control.  See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 
60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974).  Professor Macneil explained the concept:  
 
Presentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the effect of the 
future on the present. It is a recognition that the course of the future is so unalterably 
bound by present conditions that the future has been brought effectively into the present 
so that it may be dealt with just as if it were in fact the present. Thus, the presentiation of 
a transaction involves restricting its expected future effects to those defined in the 
present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction. 
 
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, 
and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 863 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
 
8 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1306 (1933). 
 
9 See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the 
Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1996); see also G. A. Swanson, Accountability 
and the Drift Towards ‘Fair Value Measurement’, AM. ACCT. ASS’N REGIONAL MEETING PAPER, SSRN ID 
= 487043 (Apr. 6, 2004); see generally FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
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but the remaining subjective element puts it in tension with the cardinal accounting tenet 
of conservatism. 
 
 The fair value movement also has implications for revenue determinations.  
Accounting holds that revenues are not to be recognized until the earnings process 
generating them is complete (or substantially complete).  An exception arises for 
investments in marketable securities, where gains and losses are recognized according to 
periodic changes in related market values of the assets.  This so-called mark-to-market 
accounting is quintessentially a quest to bring into accounting a component of the future: 
investment values are assumed to reflect the present value of the related asset’s future 
cash flow. 
 
 Enron Corp.’s pathologically fiendish managers delighted in the rise of these 
characteristics of contemporary accounting as they were influenced by modern finance 
theory.  It persuaded the SEC to approve using mark-to-market accounting in most of its 
businesses.  It entered into long-term contracts and used fair value measures to assess 
contract value.  It then recorded those values as revenue upon contract formation.  This 
shredded basic principles of revenue recognition.  It made Enron’s income statement and 
balance sheet ridiculous. Enron’s specific escapades reflect widespread cultural obsession 
with cash flows, justified, in turn, by systematic diminishment of another longstanding 
principle of accounting, the accrual system. 
 
 Accounting’s traditional accrual system allocates economic events to discrete 
fiscal periods based upon a link to underlying business activity.  It contrasts with the 
cash-basis of accounting, which records events when cash is exchanged.  The accrual 
system’s key device, the matching principle, pursues this aspiration by insisting that 
expenses burden the income statement in the period they contribute to revenue generation 
(or earlier if this cannot be determined).  The focus is on the income statement. The 
accrual system’s theoretical basis includes the stewardship function of accounting 
information, a fundamentally historical perspective reflecting how well managers have 
operated a business.  
 
 Spurred by finance theory, in 1987, a separate statement of cash flows joined the 
balance sheet and income statement as an essential component of a set of general purpose 
financial statements.10  The accrual system obscures cash flows; the cash flow statement 
makes them transparent.  Financial statement analysts and finance theorists increasingly 
focus on cash flows, casting doubt upon the utility of the accrual basis of accounting and 
its focus on the income statement.  Consider the following assertion made in an important 
article by a leading financial economist: cash flow is a fact, while earnings are an 
opinion.11  
                                                 
10 FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (SFAS) NO. 95, 
STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS ¶ 27 (Nov. 1987); Cunningham, An Essay on the True and Fair View, supra 
note ___ (providing historical perspective). 
 
11 Pablo Fernández, Cash Flow is a Fact; Net Income is Just an Opinion (Sept. 2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=330540. A famous contemporary debate in accounting theory evaluates 
 5
Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud, Buffalo Law Review (2005) 
 
 The cash flow statement’s power opens up possibilities for accounting never 
plausible with the balance sheet and income statement alone.  Some are desirable, but 
only when all three statements are used together.  Thus, for example, the cash flow 
statement is often superior compared to the balance sheet for measuring accruals as a way 
to test for the presence of earnings management in the income statement.12  Also, past 
cash flows often are better indicators of future cash flows than are earnings, although 
predictions can be improved by using the two together. 
 
 On the other hand, a leading use of the cash flow statement is a basis for making 
valuation determinations.13  In fact, discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation became, in the 
latter half of the 20th century, the dominant valuation method, rendering to history’s 
dustbins traditional valuation using assets or earnings.  Despite resistance through the 
early 1980s,14 DCF now is routinely used to gauge fair value.  Institutions ranging from 
U.S. courts to the World Bank endorse DCF valuation methods.15   
 
 Two sets of assumptions are necessary to use DCF, both of which invoke finance 
rather than accounting concepts.  First, on a cash flow statement amounts are usually 
specified—they are accounting facts—but when analyzing them a wide variety of 
possibilities appear.  They all start with GAAP earnings but then exclude or include a 
host of discretionary items.16  Resulting expressions (like EBIT, EBIDTA and so on) are 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether valuation according to earnings or cash flows is superior.  Compare Stephen Penman, On 
Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity Valuation, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RESEARCH (2001) (the case that accounting matters and that accrual-earnings based valuation models are 
superior to cash flow models) with Russell J. Lundholm & Terry O’Keefe, On Comparing Cash Flow and 
Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity Valuation: A Response to Penman 2001, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RESEARCH (2001) (when applied correctly, valuation models using earnings and cash flow should yield 
identical estimates). 
 
12 See Gopal V. Krishnan & James A. Largay, The Predictive Ability of Direct Method Cash Flow 
Information, 27 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 215 (2000). 
 
13 See e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE (2000); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. 
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed. 1991); WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002); compare BRUCE C.N. GREENWALD, ET AL., VALUE INVESTING 
(2001) (the case against making discounted cash flow analysis the dominant valuation method in favor of 
emphasizing asset-based valuation or earnings-based valuation). 
 
14 Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (abandoning previous business valuation 
framework reliant upon a weighted average of value estimated using assets, earnings and market price, in 
favor of framework permitting all generally recognized valuation methods, the ascendant one of which was 
DCF).   
 
15 See M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (1999); WORLD BANK,  REPORT TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  Sept. 
21, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1363,1379 (1992).  
 
16 Common short-hands include earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings before interest, taxes 
and depreciation (EBITD), and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).  
In each case, adjustments are made by subtracting from resulting cash-flow figures estimates of future 
required reinvestments in the business for capital expenditures. 
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not accounting concepts.17  Rather, they are recent inventions of investment bankers and 
other financiers.18 Second, DCF analysis projects cash flows into the distant future, at 
least five years and often with estimates using growth rates extending into an infinite 
horizon period.19  Popularity of DCF thus underlines a shift in the balance of intellectual 
power towards finance and against accounting. 
 
 Despite finance theory’s predictions, managers manipulate accounting forms and 
markets are fooled, as the late 1990s dramatically testify.20 Apart from such experience, a 
burgeoning theoretical and experimental literature draws upon behavioral psychology. 
This undercuts modern finance theory and explains realities it cannot explain.21  A key 
concept is frame dependence, a bias to apprehend information differently according to 
how it is presented.  This literature’s relation to accounting forms is clear.  It can matter 
whether and how stock options are measured and reported on the income statement, even 
though no cash flows exchange hands.22    
 
 A difficulty with behavioral challenges to efficiency theory is their inherent 
messiness, contrasted with the elegant beauty of efficient markets.  Behavioral theories 
explain a wide range of often conflicting biases whereas efficiency theory assumes a 
market behaving as if all actors were economically rational. Finance personifies the old 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17  In fact, FASB-ordained GAAP prohibits providing cash flow per share figures in a set of general 
purpose financial statements.  See FIN. ACC. STANDARDS BD., RELEASE ___. 
 
18  See H. Erik Lee & Heidi Lee, Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. ___ 
(March/April 2002). 
 
19 See CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS, supra note 
___, ch. 12 (discussion of valuation techniques, including DCF). 
 
20 A dramatic large-scale example is the tele-com industry’s capitalizing of line costs that kept their stock 
prices high; they plummeted when it became clear these should have been expensed.  See Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 
CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (providing description of the largest frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
including in the tele-com industry).  Another example is how investors responded to different accounting 
for acquisitions under the now-repealed purchase-pooling distinction.  See Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. 
Houston & Michael F. Peters, Purchase, Pooling and Equity Analysts’ Valuation, ACCOUNTING REVIEW 
(July 2000). 
 
21 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994) (critique of efficient market 
hypothesis using chaos theory and noise theory); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and 
Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using 
noise theory and prospect theory). 
 
22 Numerous other examples appear.  Consider America-On-Line’s (AOL’s) decision whether to capitalize 
or expense disbursements to build its Internet subscriber data base.  AOL capitalized these; the market price 
reflected this; when AOL changed under pressure to expense these costs, the market price reflected the 
change.  Consider the general practice in the tele-com industry of treating capacity swaps as asset and 
revenue transactions rather than as liability and expense transactions.  See supra note ___. 
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economists’ joke about looking for one’s car keys under a light in a parking lot because 
the light is better—despite losing the keys in some other location.  It takes too seriously 
Milton Friedman’s specification that the test of an economic theory is not its descriptive 
accuracy but its predictive efficacy.  Even on these terms, moreover, efficiency theory’s 
failure to predict—even affirmatively to obscure—market deception of the late 1990s 
suggests that it does not pass Friedman’s test. 
 
 In fact, however, both efficiency and behavioral accounts of market behavior may 
be partially correct, producing a middle ground.  Markets may be substantially efficient, 
but prone to periodic bouts of moodiness better captured by behavioral theories.  Such 
bouts appear to have characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s and their associated 
frauds.23 If so, this experience suggests that accounting forms matter most when they are 
least likely to be obeyed. Accounting’s traditional numerical history and its income 
statement are thus particularly important during innovative periods such as the late 1990s 
and early 2000s when market appetites peak for prognosis using forecasted cash flows, 
discounted to present value in a thirst for presentiation. 
 
 In this middle ground, reliable accounting is a central piston in the efficient 
market engine.  Finance and accounting must be melded into complements, not jealous 
opponents.  Attention would center on blending income statements, balance sheets and 
cash flow statements, balancing numerical history with prognosis.  Alas, the symptoms 
manifest in the late 1990s showing finance theory’s dominance over accounting endure, 




 A simple illustration captures the difference between finance and accounting.  If a 
company sold 5 widgets last year, it is clearly a lie for its management to report selling 6.  
If management says it expects to sell 6 widgets next year, it is not clearly a lie to say they 
hope to sell 7.  Finance is most interested in expectations, focusing on 6 or 7; accounting 
is most interested in the facts, that 5 were sold.   
 
 Finance theory thus feeds a common feature of accounting fraud, which is simply 
to paint rosy views of the future.  A manager believes certain targets can be reached—
expecting 6 and hoping for 7. This belief supports the view that the future reporting of 
numerical history will be superior—better than 5.  This can create sufficient managerial 
optimism to doctor current pictures of numerical history (call it 6 this year); the tempted 
manager may believe that the rosier future will be capable of absorbing the difference 
between actual history and the imagined future (if the company in fact sells 5 this year 
but 7 the year after, management can call it 6 apiece).24   
                                                 
23  See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2002); see also ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT 
MARKETS (2001). 
 
24  Cf.  In the Matter of BT Securities Corporation, 58 S.E.C. DOCKET 1145, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041 (Dec., 
22 1994), reprinted in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE: CASES 
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 Two salient features of the late 1990s dramatize indulgence of finance theory over 
accounting practice. These were proliferation of analyst earnings reports specifying 
expectations and corporate pro forma figures expressing hopes.  
 
 Wall Street analysts are steeped in the finance school, not the accounting school.  
They may actually believe they, as the market, know better than the accounting.  While 
some undoubtedly take accounting standards seriously and insist on evaluating 
performance using accounting information, many—during the late 1990s at least—
pressured managers into making elaborate forecasts of future performance.  This was 
delicately called “guidance” and led analysts to define and disseminate “expectations.”  
Many of these analysts, moreover, worked for securities firms whose investment banking 
department sought underwriting business from companies the analysts followed.  The 
coziness of the relationship magnified the inclination to extract rosy predictions of the 
future from the past. For the analyst community, moreover, social proof set in: if 
everyone believes a forecast, it must be true. 
 
 These futuristic orientations pressured management to recast actual historical 
experience, to conform to and facilitate prognostications.  The practice of pro forma 
financial reporting became widespread in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This involved 
presenting financial data in forms deliberately varying from GAAP.  While managers 
defended these using various obfuscating arguments, including that GAAP just didn’t 
work well for their special business, underlying the practice was an impulse to show how 
the future would (hopefully) look. The practice was obnoxious, omitting items of 
ordinary expense and making other GAAP departures to display steadily growing sales, 
net income and—most importantly—cash flow.  In an era of market bubbles such as the 
late 1990s, people wanted to believe these giddy pictures of the future.  Efficiency theory 
reinforced the fantasies since participants were able to conclude that the market must be 
right—a whole new economy must have been born.  
 
 These symptomatic practices spawned respective sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 cracking down on their proliferation.25 These reforms, however, address fail 
to rectify underlying impulse and demand for prognosis rather than history.  Greater 
emphasis on the future is most evident in the longer-term trend begun in the mid-1970s 
with the advent of the forward-looking disclosure regime, the disease that breeds 
finance’s dominance over accounting.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(2d ed. 1996), at 286.  In this matter, tape recordings of a derivatives trader captured him describing how 
undisclosed losses on a client account would be made up when the market moved favorably, as follows: 
 
. . . [T]he real number was 14.  So now if the real number is 16, we’ll tell him that it is 
11. You know, just slowly chip away at that differential between what it really is and 
what we’re telling him. 
 
25  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 401(b) (pro forma) & 501 (analysts), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 











 Until the late 1970s, the SEC and federal securities law prohibited disclosure of 
forward-looking information.26  In that period, market appetite for forward-looking 
information intensified.27  Participants pressured the SEC to change its stance.  After 
substantial resistance, the SEC relented, allowing forward-looking disclosure.  
Thereafter, the SEC went further, encouraging and sometimes requiring forward-looking 
information.28  The SEC characterizes related disclosure as addressing “trends and 
uncertainties” in a business.29  This opens up accounting’s traditional conservatism 
towards finance theory’s obsession with estimations and discounting the future. 
 
 The movement for forward-looking disclosure blossomed in the early 1970s, as 
efficient market theory became ascendant.30  Opponents of forward-looking disclosure 
made three key arguments favoring the SEC’s traditional stance prohibiting 
prognostication.31 First, forward-looking statements are inherently unreliable and 
misleading per se.32  No one is clairvoyant; management can be no more clairvoyant than 
                                                 
26 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5362; EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 9984, [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH ) ¶ 79,211 at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) (“It has been the 
Commission's longstanding policy generally not to permit projections to be included in . . . reports filed 
with the Commission”); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GUIDES FOR DISCLOSURE OF 
PROJECTIONS FOR FUTURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5992 (1978) 
(authorizing forward-looking disclosure). 
 
27  E.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. (Summer 
1976) at 32, 35-37. 
 
28 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (“The 
Commission encourages the use . . . of management's projections of future economic performance that have 
a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format.”); id., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) 
(mandating disclosure of “any known trends or uncertainties that [management] reasonably expects will 
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing operations”). 
 
29  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; see 
generally Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A Disclosure, 25 SEC. REG. L. J. 239 
(1997). 
 
30  John Burton, Elephants, Flexibility and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 29 BUS. LAW. 152 
(1974) [hereinafter Burton, Elephants and Flexibility]; see also Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, 
Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970) [hereinafter Kripke, Myths and Realities]. 
 
31   See Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulations, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 
307 (1961) (despite reality that investment value is a function of future financial performance, managers 
are not clairvoyant and management attempts at forecasting are “almost invariably . . .  misleading because 
they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist”). 
 
32  SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note ___, at 611. 
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investors or other users of financial reports.  Second, investors likely would assign undue 
credence to formal managerial disclosure of forward-looking information, despite this 
inherent unreliability.  Third, forward-looking information is susceptible to managerial 
manipulation to a far greater degree than is hard historical fact.  All three objections have 
proven valid, underscored by the accounting frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
 Supporters of forward-looking disclosure emphasized that all investment 
valuation and related decisions are about the future, a point opponents did not dispute.  
Disagreement concerned whether managers or investors are better positioned to conduct 
prognostication.  While supporters did not believe either group was clairvoyant, they 
opined that managers were somehow better equipped than investors to provide reasonable 
forecasts.33 This represented a subtle shift in roles: traditionally, managers applied 
accounting to report results of known events and transactions and investors applied 
finance tools to make related investment decisions.  
 
 Devotees of forward-looking disclosure also redefined the target audience for 
financial disclosure from the average ordinary investor to the sophisticated investor; this 
move sought to negate the claim that investors would give undue credence to managerial 
forecasts.34  Finally, manipulation risk could be neutralized by imposing on managers an 
obligation of good faith when providing forward-looking disclosure.35 
 
 The debate’s resolution led to a system requiring more and more forward-looking 
disclosure, with SEC releases in 1979, 1982 and 1989 increasing this orientation.36  Early 
proponents disagreed as to whether this regime should be voluntary or mandatory; the 
result was initially an experimental regime based on voluntary disclosure.  It gradually 
moved to one mandating specific kinds of forward-looking disclosure.37   
 
 As for whether forward-looking information should be targeted at the 
sophisticated investor or all investors, terms of debate shifted from the 1970s to the 
1990s. Early on, supporters argued that managers should provide forecasts to 
sophisticated investors outside formal SEC filings.38  While this approach dominated for 
                                                 
33  See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note ___. 
 
34  See Burton, Elephants and Flexibility, supra note ___.  
 
35 See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note ___, at 1198-99. 
 
36  See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note ___, at 611 (SEC’s 1982 adoption of 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K concerning MD&A and forward-looking information “is the key part of the 
evolution of the Commission’s approach to accounting from an emphasis on ‘hard fact’ to its present 
emphasis on ‘soft’ or predictive information.  It is a comprehensive disclosure item”). 
 
37 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note ___, at 559-561. 
 
38 Compare Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note ___ (objecting to extant practice that SEC position 
perpetuated of “differential disclosure,” meaning professionals receiving projections in presentations, 
conference calls and press releases the public at large did not receive) with Burton, Elephants and 
Flexibility, supra note ___ (urging reorientation of SEC target audience from “the investor without clout, if 
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two decades, the SEC reversed course in the late 1990s by adopting Regulation FD to 
require that guidance provided to one investor must be provided simultaneously to the 
public at large.39 This step completed the circle that the forward-looking disclosure 
regime inaugurated: (1) managers were redirected from accounting to finance and (2) all 
investors were functionally brought inside the enterprise by mandates that managers 
supply finance-oriented information. 
 
 Regulatory efforts ensuing from the forward-looking disclosure debate thus 
resolved numerous contentious questions.  The resulting regime is mostly mandatory; 
good faith and reasonable bases are required; and all investors—sophisticated and novice 
alike—are entitled to the same predictions. Never resolved in this debate on the merits, 
however, is the argument of opponents that forward-looking information is inherently 
unreliable.  It remains true, after all, that no one is clairvoyant.  The late 1990s and early 
2000s also show that even so-called sophisticated investors are not immune from being 
fooled by managerial manipulations.   
 
 Accordingly, the SEC’s early cautious regulatory response to market demand for 
futuristic information showed prudence. In fact, the reality that forward-looking 
information is inherently unreliable manifested immediately upon implementation of the 
forward-looking disclosure regime. Managers would forecast various business 
developments for market participants eager to clarify their own cloudy crystal balls.  
When these judgments turned out differently, plaintiffs’ lawyers sued.  This litigation 
showed symptoms of the underlying reality that forward-looking information is 
inherently unreliable.  Rather than ever confronting this reality squarely, the regulatory 
regime focused on these symptoms by designing devices to address associated litigation 
abuses.40 
 
 The leading device to address litigation abuses associated with forward-looking 
information is a body of safe harbor provisions.  These insulate issuers from liability in 
private actions when forward-looking statements are accompanied by cautionary 
language underscoring their basic unreliability. The SEC, Congress and courts all 
participated in developing related doctrines.41  The judiciary used the so-called bespeaks-
                                                                                                                                                 
you will” and “sophisticated investors and professional analysts through whom information would be 
filtered down to less sophisticated investors and their brokers”). 
 
39  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING, FINAL RULE: 
65 FED. REG. 51,716 (2000). 
 
40  See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note ___, at 559-560 (quoting SEC official 
and leading securities lawyer of the period, A. A. Sommer, as saying that litigation aspects were the 
“biggest headache” associated with the new forward-looking disclosure regime).   
 
41 See Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Section 27A of the 1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 
Act).  For a concise summary of the intricate provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
addressing the relationship between its safe-harbor provisions and the kinds of forward-looking information 
that are required, encouraged, and permitted, see Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Karen Kennard, Greater 
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caution doctrine.42 It provided a case-by-case evaluation of whether forward-looking 
information was accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert a reasonable 
investor to the information’s tentative quality.  The SEC and Congress essentially 
codified this doctrine. 
 
 While some evidence indicates that the forward-looking disclosure system 
enhanced overall quality of information and its interpretation,43 drawbacks appear.44  
Managers forecast future earnings and equip analysts to do so; analysts then widely 
disseminate expectations across the market-place; enormous pressure to meet those 
expectations arises.  (When a company sold 5 widgets, it created a historical record; when 
its management says they expect to sell 6 and hope to sell 7, they create expectations and 
hopes.)  Managers who fail to meet expectations and hopes are punished severely.  This, 
in turn, increases pressure to enhance reports of numerical history to conform to the 
prognosis previously painted.45  The result is often escalating accounting pressure to 
repaint history to conform to increasingly out-of-reach prognosis. 
 
 These effects are not met by regulatory efforts to police litigation abuse arising 
from prognostication.  More problematic than second-guessing by litigation is the first-
order stage on which this information is demanded and supplied.  But this problem 
likewise has never been addressed. Demand for forward-looking information is demand 
for what is inherently unreliable.  Supplying the information sets markers that are bound 
to result in disappointment.  Specifying the targets creates pressure to meet them, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Expectations: Risk Disclosure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 331, 335-354 (1996). 
  
42 See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 
F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 
799 (11th Cir. 1999) (also interpreting Congressional and SEC safe harbor provisions); see generally 
Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994). 
 
43 COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note ___, at 6 (citing Artyom Durnev et al., Law, 
Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, PRESENTATION AT THE AMERICAN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING (May 12, 2001) (examining impact of mandatory 
forward-looking disclosure in MD&A on share prices). 
 
44 See Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477 (1994) (reviewing history 
of forward-looking disclosure regime and examining litigation arising under it). For a general assessment 
and prescriptions to reform the forward-looking disclosure regime not using safe-harbors but through 
formal SEC release articulating its parameters and furnishing detailed guidance, see Joel Seligman, The 
SEC’s Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995); see also Suzanne J. 
Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 245 (1993) (providing more optimistic assessment). 
 
45  In theory, ex ante awareness of future punishment for disappointed expectations should constrain 
managerial optimism; in practice, this constraint is weak.  See Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say 
No to Wall Street, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 14 (2002). 
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when fundamental business strategies cannot do so, accounting massage becomes more 
tempting.46 In the extreme, finance destroys accounting.  
 
 Not only has inadequate attention been paid to this feature of the contemporary 
financial reporting environment,47 the safe-harbor mechanisms used to address the 
identified litigation problem appear equally inadequate to their task.  Needed is a policy 
to address both challenges.  This must constrain undue second-guessing litigation and 
limit forecasting likely to pressure managers to report accounting figures in light of those 
estimates rather than based on subsequent business reality. 
 
IV. METASTASIZING  
 
 Despite limitations of peering into the future using forward-looking disclosure, 
reforms push further in that direction.  This shows not only potential misdiagnose of the 
disease and questionable prescription, it manifests the depth and ubiquity of modern 
culture’s preoccupation with the future.  Two reforms highlight: movement towards a 
continuous disclosure system and development of an early warning system provided by 
auditors based on the quality of an entity’s internal control over financial reporting. 
 
The apotheosis of modernity’s future obsession in securities markets and law is 
the pressure for a continuous disclosure system.  This is a concept designed to require 
real-time display of various financial developments.48 Long sought by market participants 
                                                 
46  Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 126 (1997): 
 
Forward-looking disclosure . . . must often be made with less-than-complete confidence 
of their accuracy, with the nagging sense that with more time, doubts about data quality 
might naturally diminish. From time to time, senior executives will discover, much too 
late, that the truth is indeed quite different from what they have been led to believe. To be 
sure, senior executives cannot explicitly acknowledge this. Part of the essential 
dramaturgical role of senior managers is to communicate confidence and control over 
their environment, and . . . many management theorists believe that effective corporate 
disclosure must reflect a comparable level of confidence in control, if not performance, 
by the senior management group. Thus, even putting aside the possibility that those top 
managers have their own selfish reasons to distort, there is a substantial risk of a 
mismatch between what they say and what, once a retrospective look at what all those in 
the organization actually knew or sensed is undertaken, was “known” by others in the 
firm. 
 
Mismatch risk poses two challenges: second-guessing litigation, which the securities law framework has 
addressed, and pressure to finesse a match, to which inadequate attention appears to be paid.  Compare 
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. L. REV. 773 
(2004) (examining judicial responses to disappointed expectations arising from prognosis). 
 
47 Debate concerning the merits of a forward-looking disclosure system was intense in the 1970s (see supra 
notes ___-___ and accompanying text), but thereafter cooled and the system’s role in the financial frauds of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s was neglected.  
 
48  See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); Dale Arthur Oseterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure 
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and recently encouraged by the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) adds force to this 
movement by directing the SEC to adopt rules to hasten the phenomenon.  Under SOX, 
companies must disclose publicly on a “rapid and current basis” all material changes in 
their financial condition or operations, including trends providing qualitative information 
and graphic presentations.49   
 
 SOX uses the word “disclose,” disguising its more profound shift in market 
appetite and regulatory philosophy—likewise disguising latent dangers.  The innovation 
of the original federal securities laws was a move to disclosure.  Mandatory disclosure, 
Brandeis famously quipped, is the best disinfectant.50  Current pressures for real-time 
display go beyond disclosure.  They move towards transparency.  Again, this shift 
reflects finance-driven pressure towards real-time accounting, presenting enormous 
challenges to basic accounting concepts such as allocation of economic events to multiple 
fiscal periods.  Accompanying these pressures, moreover, are appetites for systems and 
research designed to provide a continuous auditing function, despite numerous 
recognized obstacles to this undertaking.51 
 
 Contemporary calls for heightened transparency across society often appear as 
unbounded virtues.52  But good reasons appear to doubt this proposition.53 Bismarck 
                                                                                                                                                 
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: Are We There Yet?, 20 CARDOZO L REV. 135 (1998); see 
also Erik D. Prohs, Note, Periodic Reporting: A Relic of the Past?, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 481 (2002). 
 
49 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6. 
 
50 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914), at 92 (“Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). 
 
51 See Vernon J. Richardson & Susan W. Scholz, Corporate Reporting and the Internet: Vision, Reality, 
and Intervening Obstacles, 11 PACIFIC ACCOUNTING REVIEW (Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000).  Numerous 
conferences on the concept of continuous auditing have been staged in recent years.  See Rutgers 
Accounting Website, www.raw.edu. 
 
52  See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You 
Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996): 
 
 Transparency is an eleventh commandment of American life generally, not just 
of financial markets. We insist on open hearings all through government; we open up to 
public scrutiny under the Freedom of Information Act the records that elsewhere would 
be kept confidential; we relentlessly pursue the tax returns and business dealings of 
almost anyone seeking high public office. We do all this as part of the public's 
unquestioned (if sometimes exaggerated) “right to know.” It comes as no surprise that 
what is so ubiquitous in our society should affect the financial reporting of the country's 
major businesses. 
 
Professor Lowenstein’s comments addressed the traditional disclosure system, not the kind of transparency 
digitization injects. Calls for transparency routinely are heard concerning business, government, 
international agencies, military operations, diplomatic corps, academia and other organization types.  See 
RUPESH A. SHAH, DAVID F. MURPHY & MALCOLM MCINTOSH, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: CREATING 
TRUST IN ORGANISATIONS: STORIES OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE (2003); 
Williams, Corporate Social Transparency, supra note ___; see also supra note ___. 
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reportedly cautioned: “If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one 
being made.”54  The same is true for those who like financial reports.  Consider how 
managers are to develop this continuous information-display. 
 
 Companies daily generate internal financial data, such as sales, accounts 
receivable balances and charge-offs, and inventory levels and obsolescence.  These show 
trends.  They can amount, on a temporary basis, to material changes in financial 
condition and operation.  Mandatory display of these is functionally equivalent to 
mandatory transparency of business operations on a daily basis.   It opens for view daily 
financial recording, not periodic financial reporting.  This echoes the process associated 
with the dawn of forward-looking disclosure era of managers generating finance data and 
distributing it to investors.  
 
 Besides impairing the efficacy of accounting’s fiscal-period assumption, daily 
changes are not indicative of quarterly or annual aggregates.  This information is most 
useful to managers during an accounting/operating period.  It equips them to make course 
corrections, taking such steps as strengthening sales efforts in lagging segments or 
improving collection practices when receivables charge-offs rise in certain customer 
bases.  The information is useful to redirect trends and to manage the materiality and 
direction of financial condition and operation.   
 
 Whether corrections succeed take more than a few days of dashboard data to sort 
out.  Premature disclosure of adverse trends may sustain them, disabling managerial 
corrections. If sales are seen flat in one region, customers in adjacent regions may switch 
to competitor products; if receivables collections are seen slowing among some 
customers, other customers may join the laggards.  Investors and other corporate 
constituents likely are better served giving management time and leeway to make 
improvements, not respond to them on a daily basis.55 
 
 If the new rules under Sarbanes-Oxley only tinker with mandatory continuous 
display, consider a proposal for pure transparency made by a senior SEC official.56  It 
                                                                                                                                                 
53  For a careful assessment of the appeal and limits of transparency, using the example of corporate voting 
in the mutual fund industry, see Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not 
Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (2003).  
 
54  Quoted in KERMIT L. HALL, ED., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW (2002), at vii. 
 
55  E.g., Kitch, Theory and Practice, supra note ___, at 847-861 (general analysis concluding with example 
of how disclosure concerning Caterpillar Inc. subsidiary in politically-unstable Brazil could have 
exacerbated political risks); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An 
Analysis of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990) (explaining how managerial 
withholding of information may benefit investors rather than harm them as often assumed). 
 
56  Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An Alternative to the 
‘Independent’ Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347 (2004) [hereinafter, Chan, Breaking the 
Market’s Dependence].  When Mr. Chan’s article was published, he was Associate Regional Director, 
Enforcement, in the SEC’s Midwest Regional Office.  (His views, of course, do not necessarily represent 
those of the SEC.) 
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prescribes changing the existing financial reporting environment using two devices: (1) 
requiring companies to report real-time bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible 
Web sites (including real-time journal entries, ledger summaries, monthly aggregations 
and so on) and (2) requiring management to respond publicly to questions concerning this 
information.  
 
 The theory of this substantive transparency (not mere disclosure) is to equip 
investors having requisite interest and resources to perform their own financial statement 
audits of companies, or engage their own auditor to do so.  Apart from numerous other 
practical problems,57 it is doubtful that such deep transparency is in the best interests of 
corporations or investors.58   But the proposal shows enduring reform-based emphasis on 
finance (transparency) not accounting (disclosure).   
 
 The second reform highlighting the urge for transparency concerns auditing.  In 
traditional financial statement audits, auditors speak as of a moment in time about 
financial statements prepared as of a prior date and for a prior period, providing hard 
facts.  These are attestations of numerical history.  Auditors are financial archeologists.  
They provide three paragraphs of standardized text to express unqualified opinions, and 
offer a few additional sentences in other situations.   
 
 Reforms implemented in mid-2004 vastly expand the auditor’s task, transforming 
it from financial archeologist of numerical history into a forecaster of financial reporting.  
The reform requires auditors to test and opine upon a company’s internal control over 
financial reporting.59  Though based upon a current examination and providing an 
opinion about control maintenance during a past accounting period, it is quintessentially 
about the future—the auditing standard describes itself as creating an “early warning 
system.”60   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
57 As examples: (1) supplied information is raw bookkeeping data and limited questionnaire access to 
management; neither investors nor their auditors have access to a company’s system of internal control, 
audit committees, walk-through exercises, or other essential resources used in traditional auditing and (2) 
the result would require enormous investor coordination and/or result in numerous separate investor-audits, 
generating wasteful duplicative costs.  
 
58 See Udo C. Brändle & Jürgen Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked Corporation?, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=523102 (2004) (making the specific case against utter 
transparency in corporate financial reporting); see generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: 
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) 
(expressing more general reservations); Elizabeth J. Boros, Corporations Online, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L. 
___ (2001) (survey of 100 large Australian companies documents grounds for skepticism as to using 
corporate Web sites to deliver “universal real-time free access to continuous disclosure information”).  This 
concern is wholly apart from protecting proprietary information that would necessarily be covered by such 
a proposal.  See Chan, supra note ___, at 391-92. 
 
59 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN AUDIT 
OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004) [hereinafter AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2].  
 
60 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note ___, ¶ 6. 
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 The key trigger requiring auditor forward-looking disclosure is the existence of a 
material weakness in such control.  The concept of material weakness is forward-looking, 
defined as risk that material misstatements will not be detected or prevented in the future.  
The auditing standard requires auditors to describe material weaknesses along with their 
actual or potential future effects on the company’s financial statements.   
 
 The early warning system’s likely effectiveness must be evaluated by comparison 
to the kindred system of forward-looking disclosure in place for business substance since 
the 1970s.  At a minimum, to make this system meaningful likely will require the same 
kinds of safe harbor concepts developed for the forward-looking disclosure system.61 
Even those, of course, produced imperfections in the relation between forward narrative 
and eventual reporting of numerical history.  Analogous challenges appear in this control 
audit innovation. 
 
 A virtue appears in this otherwise indulgent futurism.  It rejects finance theory’s 
implications that accounting controls are of limited utility. This rejection is a useful 
antidote to widespread preoccupation with the future seen creating demand and supply 
for phony financial forecasting. On balance, however, it amounts to one step forward and 




 Numerous policies may be designed to address the problem of forward-looking 
information.  This Essay identifies two.  One is legal: redefining the disclosure standards 
applied to managers.  One is business-related: redefining how financial figures are 
reported. Both address the inherent unreliability of forecasts, which the forward-looking 
disclosure regime never has.  
 
 The first policy cure operates within the existing forward-looking disclosure 
regime.  Rather than require, permit, or encourage managers to provide forecasts of 
earnings (or other measures), the regime could simply require managers to disclose 
material risks of future adversity.62  The purpose of this regime would be to provide a 
basis for investors to gauge the degree to which a company’s numerical history is useful 
as a guide to probable future performance.  Inherently unreliable estimates of future 
performance would not be required, permitted or encouraged.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
61   See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, 
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L. J. ___ (2004). 
 
62 See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection: The SEC and the 
Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1154-56 (2003) (prescribing a complete overall of 
MD&A to provide “what investors really want and need [which] is a warning of material future risks  . . . 
[and] discussion of their probability and magnitude from management's perspective . . .”). 
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 The second policy cure prescription operates within an altered framework for 
accounting.  It takes one lesson from finance.  Accounting should not use a single figure 
for every financial statement item (aggregating underlying transactions). In many cases, 
only estimates are reasonably possible, even for events and circumstances that have 
occurred.  The appropriate amount of reserves for doubtful accounts and the methods for 
measuring inventory and cost of inventory sold are not capable of definitive 
measurement.  Yet accounting has always imposed this result.  (Managers cited this as 
one reason for using pro forma figures—although these figures also often pinpointed 
single figures.) 
 
 The solution is straightforward.  Accounting figures should be reported in ranges, 
not single amounts. Thus accounting should abandon the conceit of computing a single 
number for earnings and a single number for owners’ equity and instead report a range of 
reasonable figures for each.  This would more fairly reflect the fundamental challenges 
and limits of accounting, a system tied to numbers and history yet still capable only of 
providing ranges with any reliability. After all, when used to aggregate large numbers of 
measurements, the reliability of single discrete measurements degrades.  The need for 
such a change is increasingly important as contemporary events—both scandals and 




 Finance—and the digitized-information age—demand from accounting what it 
cannot reliably deliver.  Reforms enhancing the orientation toward the future not only 
miss the points but exacerbate what they miss.  Feeding the beast of information-hungry 
finance culture must be accompanied with training the beast. Mankind has long dreamt of 
knowing tomorrow’s news today and contemporary culture whets that appetite because it 
seems so much more within reach. In accounting and securities regulation, however, 
hunger for tomorrow’s news today can be perilous.63  Finance and accounting must work 
together to overcome these tensions—and the limits of each discipline.  Lawyers 
involved in formulating federal securities disclosure policy would benefit by 
reconsideration of market fascination with the future; this essay scratches the surface. 
 
63   Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (insider trading conviction arising from Wall Street 
Journal columnist privately and criminally sharing tomorrow’s news today). 
 
